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In the Sttprente Court of the
State of Utah

SH!ERMAN JONES, MERLE JONES,
BRYANT JONES and LARAINE JONES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
:\LVIE L. THORVALIDSON, E. NOREEN

I
CASE
NO. 10043

THORVALDSON, MERRI:LL OLDROYD
and 0. THAYNE ACORD,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Jones instituted this action by filing a comp]ajnt
asking for a declaratory judgment to determine to whom
they should pay royalty for gravel obtained by them from
property owned by MeiTill OldToyd and by him leased to
the Thorvaldsons.

The Thorvaldsons filed a counterclaim
against the Jones and at the end of the trial on the counterclaim the Court found that the Jones had forfeited
their rights in the leased property for an implied covenant.
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'Dhe only parties in this case on appeal are the Jones
and the Thorvaldsons. The action between the ThorvaJ.dsons and the Oldroyds and Acord was disposed of prior to
the trial of the case between the Jones and the Thorvaldsons. In that action 1Jhe Court held that the Thorvaldsons
held no interest in 1:!he Oldroyd property, this being a gravel pit mentioned in the lease hereinafter set forth. The
Thorvaldsons have not appealed from that decision. Hereafter, reference to the parties will be as Jones and Thorvaldsons.
The question in this case is whether the Jones' alleged violations of the terms of a written lease, the applicaJble parts of which are set forth below, are such as to authorize :fue trial Court to find that the Jones had forfeited their rights in the property described in said lease.
We set forth the pertinent parts of the lease entered
into between Thorvaldsons and Jones: TR. 8.
''This agreement, made and entered into this 11th day
of December, A. D. 1957, by and between Alvie L.
Thorvaldson and E. Noreen Thorvaldson, his wife, of
Payson, Utah County, State of Utah, hereinafter called
the Parties of the First Part, Lessors, and Sherman
Jones and Merle Jones, his wife, and Bryant Jones
and Laraine Jones, his wife, of Delrta, Millard County,
State of Utah, hereinafter called the Parties of the Second Part, ·Lesees.

WITNESSETII:
"That the Lessors, Parties of the first part, for and in
consideration of the rents, covenants and agreements
hereuiafter contained on ·the part of the Lessees to be
paid, kept and performed, have granted, demised,
leased, aSSigned, and by these presents do grant, deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mise, lease, assign and let rmto the Lessees, for the
purpose of operating, mining, producing and marketing such quantities of sand, gravel, top soil and fill dirt
as may be fotmd in and on the certain tracts of land
which the parties of the first part represent they are
the owners in fee simple title, which property is more
particularly described as follows:
(Description of land omitted)
uAnd that certain parcel of land which the parties
of the first part have, by contract and agreement, acquired from Merrill L. Oldroyd and Lola Oldroyd, his
wife. of Payson, Utah, which property is described as
follows:

(Description of land omitted)
"It is agreed that the lease to the fiTst mentioned
property and the assignment of agreement and lease
to the second described property shall continue in force
and effect for a period of twenty years, from the first
day of January, 1958, to the first day of Janaury, 1978,
with the exclusive right granted to 'the Lessees herein
to renew the said lease for an additional twenty years
in accordance with the provisions and stipulations in
this agreement contained. It is agreed that the Lessees shall take possession, operate and sell gravel, sand,
soil and dirt from the said premises on and after January 1, 1958.
"In consideration of the premises, the Lessees and
Assignees herein covenant and agree to deliver or pay
to the Lessors 25 cents for each cubic yard of sand,
gravel or top soil mined, processed, or produced from
the said premises and by the Lessees disposed of on
the market, and they also agree to pay to the Lessors
one cent for each cubic yard of fill dirt removed from
the said premises . . . . Lease payments shall be
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4
made to the Lessors at Payson, Utah, unless other address is pro~ lded to the Lessees. Payments shall be
made between the first and tenth days of each three
month calendar period.
"It is agreed that the books of the Lessees shall be
aoce:;sible to the Lessors for the purpose of computing
the output of such marketed sand, grave1 and dirt at
all times. Duplicate sales slips shall be preserved in

numerical order and at regular three-month intervals
shall be subject to inspection by the Lessors. The Lessors shall also have aocess to the pits and premises at
all times for the purpose of comparison by way of quantity of sand and gravel removed therefrom.
''. . . . The Lessees agree to keep all overburden
removed which would in any way inhtbit or retard the
success of the business.
''If the Lessors own a less interest in the above described lands than herein represented, then the royalties and rentals herein provided for shall be paid the
Lessors only in proportion which their interest beaTS
to the whole and undivided fee.
"It is further stipulated and agreed between the
parties hereto that the Lessees shall conduct the said
business in such a manner as to adequately and timely
fill all orders and supply all requests of customers. If
the Lessees fail to operate the business in a proper,
businesslike ·and workmanli~ manner and/or fail because of business practices to keep up with the demand, the same will constitute grounds for forfeiture
of this lease."

The Court found that the Jones' failure to perform
any one of the following things constituted grounds to de-
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Clan» that Jones had forfeited their right in the leased
pro~rty:

( 1) Failure to remove the overburden ;
( 2) F'ailure to make sales slips for materials reasonably soon after the sale of the said materials and delivery
of tht> material to the customer;
(3) That the Jones removed sand and gravel off
tht> premises without accounting for any of it;
( 4) They abandoned the business of selling sand and
gravel on the leased premises and removed their activities
off the leased premises;
(5) Failw-e to account for all sales of sand and gravel.
The evidence :respecting those issues is as follows:
FAILURE TO REMOVE OVERBURDEN
Mr. Isaah Rex Allen, called as a witness by the Thorvaldsons. He testified that further operation of the pit
was prevented because the overburden was not removed.
TR. 140. He further testified that in removing the overburden, it could easily affect 1,000 yards.~ This witness
said it would take at least ten eightJhour days to remove
the overburden. TR. 142-143. Mr. Allen stated that so
far as he knows the Jones could be taking sand from the
pit at the time of the trial. He said the sand would be too
dirty for cement purposes. TR. 145.
Grant E. Lloyd, a son-in-law of the Thorvaldsons, and.
Thorvaldsons' witness for them, testified: "There would
be at least three days work to get this big pit in good shape
again." TR.. 246.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r
0

Thorvaldson testified that in his judginent there would
be aJbout 1,000 yards of sand contaminated. TR. 185.
Jones testified that he has never had any concrete rejected because of dirt in it. TR. 272-273. Jones stated that
he was not having any trouble with the overburden and
can remove the overburden without hazard to a driver..
TR. 24. J one~ testified that this overburden was there

when they leased the property from Thorvaldsons.

TR.

181.
F AlLURE TO :MAKE SALES SLIPS

Leon Woodfield, a Certified Public Accountant called
as a witness by Thorvaldsons, testified as follows: "In connection with tlhe audit and comparing the recorded information that I found in reports given to me by Mr. Jones,
I found some differences. For example, during the period
of October, ending Oct., 1961, there was a difference of
37.80 tons or cubic yeards, exouse me." TR. 131. That
was out of a total reported by Jones to him of 82.9.70 yards.
"In April of 1963, there was a difference of 8.5 out of 536.
There was also. a difference in the sand and gravel of 5.0
out of a total of 145. And then in May of 1962, with re~t to the sand, out of 170, there was a difference of .25
and for the gravel, 136, there was 2- ~." TR. 132.
The witness also testified that in his experience in auditing items of this kind tlhat it was not unusual to locate
or find di-fferences of this small amount. TR. 132. He
further testified that there are normally small differences
in the audit. TR. 132. In the last quarter there were larger differenCes between the report going to Mr. Thorvaldson and the repOrted sales that are not included on the report. TR. 132.
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Jones testified: "We keep om invoices in nwnerical
order and do not make them at the end of the qu~'.
Tit 170. He further stated: "As I explained before, if a
person in the case of a contract orders so many linear feet
of ditch. we go ahead and we keep track of the amount of
material we put in that ditch until that project is done
and then we will see if that is all he needs and get it approved and make sme that is all he will need, and then I
will make up the invoice." TR. 171.
"Question: Sometimes you are so busy that you can't
make them up for two or three days, is that not true?
"Answer: The only case that they may not be made
up for two or three days is if I have not received a report
from one of the other fellows or that I am out of town and
I am not there to take care of it."

TR. 171.

Mr. Thorvaldson was asked: "It is true, isn't it Mr.
Thorvaldson, that in that whole year's time, the auditor
found a difference between the records of the Jones and
that which they had reported to you of only 43.8 yards?"
TR. 227.
"Answer: I don't remember exactly. He wasn't able
to determine entirely, according to what he said. He said
he couldn't get an accurate account." TR. 227.
The witness, Thorvaldson, in testifying about what the
audit disclosed, testified that the second audit found a
shortage, but the first one wasn't too bad, and that after
the first audit had been made, Jones sent him a check for
S112.42. This covered a six months period. TR. 189-191.
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REMOVAL OF SAND AND GRAVEL WITHOUT

ACCOUNTING FOR IT.
Jones, in testifying about the amount of sand stockpiled, stated: ''There is no large amount stockpiled. There
may be 100 yards now." TR. 163.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
JONES ABANDONED THE LEASED PROPERTY AND
FORFEITED THEIR RIGHT THEREIN BY FAILURE
TO MAINTAIN A MIX BATCH PLANT ON THiE
LEASED PREMISES AND THAT UNLESS THE MIX
BATCH PLANT WAS MAINTAINED ON THE PREMISBS AND AfLL PROCESSING DONE THEREON THE
CONTRACT CONTAINED NO OONSIDERATION.
The lease above referred to was reformed to include
land not described in the lease. TR. 68. The Court, in
drawing the boundary line between the property leased to
Jones and that retained by Thorvaldson, awarded Thorvaldson property upon which a well was located from which
water was used to operate a mix batch plant (TR. 237)
and also a portable mix batch plant. TR. 236. Later, Jones
purchased five acres of land adjoining the Thorvaldson
property upon which he built a mix baitch plant and sunk
a well at a cost of $2.,000.00. TR. 280. Thereafter, all processing was done on the Jones property. TR. 110. Jones
went into possession of the leased property in January,
1958, and from that time until he was evicted from said
premises by order of the Court, continued to dig and mine
sand :fu:um the property owned by Thorvaldson and gravel
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from the property Thorvaldson had leased from Oldroyd,
and sold and delivered the same to customers. It is evident fron1 the Court's comments during the trial that the
Jones' failure to do all of their processing on the Thorvaldson property was the real reason why the Court declared a forfeiture.
The Court asked the attorney for
Thorvaldson to define the issues. Counsel replied, ''They
have moved off the property completely". TR. 109. The
Court asked, 11 Have they moved the business from the
pt-em.ises?" Counsel for Jones answered, 11 So far as the
batch plant is concerned they have." TR. 110. Counsel
for Thorvaldson, reading from the deposition of Jones: "You
didn't pay any royalty on that material you process and
manufacture on your own property?" Answer: "Only that
we removed from the leased property''. Question to Jones
by attorney for Thorvaldsoo: "Do you have any requ.iTement to take any material from Mr. Thorvaldson.'s property?" Answer: "No, there is no determined amount."
Then the Court said, "I am afraid you have got a forfeiture
here, Mr. Hodgson". TR. 111.
The Court further said:

"I am saying tJhis in view

of what we said in the other case and considering the testi-

mony we had there and the arguments and all. And it was
one of the requirements, an indispensable requirement of
the validity of the lease that they maintain that business on
those leased premises; to nrlne the sand and gravel and
process it there so that there would be consideration, and it
had to be done in a manner that would take care of ·the business and the customers for that kind of business. Now, if
they have moved off the property and proces9ed elsewhere
and get materials from other sources as well, then there is
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a forfeiture af 111-Iis lease, a failure of consideration." TR.
111-112.
The Court said that the Jones were required to maintain the business on the premises and as authority for that
proposition statc--"d: "Well, there is the requirement that
they maintain the business on the premises. (Quoting firom
the lease agreement) 'It is further stipulated and agreed

between the parties hereto that the Lessees shall conduct
the said business in such a manner as to adequately and
thnely fill all orders and supply all requests of customers.' "
TR. 114.

Mr. Hodgson: "Now it doesn't say, Your Honor, that
they conduct it upon the leased premises."
The Court: "No, those words are not in there, but
they are implicit to give validity to the lease." TR. 115.
The Court: ''As I remember the testimony in the other
case there was a business on the premises being conducted,
and this business was sold lock-stock and barrel to the Jones
boys. They bought all the equipment and then he took a
lease on the premises and agreed to pay so much royalty
for materials that went through that business-sold from
that business. And that was wheTe Mr. Thorvaldson was
gOing to derive his revenue. There would be no consideration if they coold just take that lease and hold it for 20
or 40 years and process and operate across the street or at
some other location. The lease would lack consideration."
TR. 115.
Mr. Hodgson: "But I think we have to go look at the
whole of the lease and the whole of the situation, your
Honor." TR. 115.
The Court: "I think that's right. I think you are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right.

We han' to look at the whole thing."

TR. 115.

1\Ir. Hodgson: "Part of this business was not just
the processing of sand which was taken from the Thorv:~ldson sand pit, and gravel which was taken from the
Oldroyd gravel pit and made into ready mixed concrete.
Btu part of the business was, and is, and will be in :fue
future, the taking of sand and top sodl and fill dirt or overhurdcn from the sand bed properties and selling them to
l'llstomers who come there for no other purpose than to
purchase them irrespective of whether there is a batch
plant there or a batch plant a hundred yards down the road;
and part of the conducting of that business, the business
which is the overall business of sand, gravel, and concrete,
is still being conducted and must still be oonducted under
the terms of this lease, irrespective of where these men
have their batch plant. It can still be conducted out at
that pit, irrespective of whethe·r they have a batch plant
on it or not." TR. 115-116.
The Court: "Part of it, but the processing is not done
there anymore, is it?" TR. 116.
Mr. Hodgson: "No." TR. 116.
The Court: "Then you would probably a-dmit there
is a partial failure of consideration? Mr. Thorvaldson gets
no revenue from any of the processing?" TR. 116.
Mr. Hoclgson: "That isn't true, beoause the sand
whkh they still use must come from the sand bed irrespective of where it's hatched out. And until March 1st, the
gravel which was used came from the Oldroyd pit which
was under the lease, and which, through no cause of these
plaintiffs, is now terminated." TR. 116.
The Court: "Well in my mind now that you :have ad-
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mitted that the batch plant has been removed and the processing no longer takes place there, to my mind, that constitutes a sufficient breach to work a forfeiture of the lease.
Now, the Supreme Court might not say so, if you appeal
to the Supreme Court. Therefore, you better produce all
your evidence." TR. 118.
We again quote from the Court: "Yes it was. That
he had to pay Mr. Thorvaldson forr all materials processed
on the premises; and it was within the oontemplation of
the· parties that he would process on the premises or that
word wouldn't have been in there." TR. 113.

Mr. Hodgson stated: "That is true, burt nothing was
said in that case nor in the decision in that case as to 1Jhe
requirement that they continue to bring all materials that
they might purchase onto those premises and process them."
TR. 114.
The Court replied: "Well, there is the requirement
that they maintain the business on the premises: 'It is
further stipulated and agreed between the parties hereto
that the lessee shall conduct the business in such a manner
as to adequately and timely fill ail orders and supply all
requests of customers.' " TR. 114.
The Court further said: "I think so far now there
has been no sufficient evidence to justify a forfeiture on
the ground of failure to take care of the business. But
there, as I mentioned yesterday, the removal of the business from the premises makes an entirely situation." TR.
181.
· The contract specifically provided the reason why a
forfeiture could be declared by the Thorvaldsons, and the
Thorvaldsons, after calling one witness in an attempt to
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show that the Jones had failed to conduct the business
in such a manner as to adequately and timely fill all or-

ders and supply all requests of customers, abandoned that
theory and the Court made no finding with respect thereto.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court declared a forftitw'e for something which the contract did not require
the Jones to do, to-wit: maintain a mix batch plant on the
ThorvaJdson property.

The evidence shows that from the early part of January, 1958, until they were evicted from the premises by

the Court in 1962, the Jon~ were mining and selling sand
from the Thorvaldson property and selling it to customers.
TR. 115.
Just how the maintenance of the mix batch plant on
the Thorvaldson property would promote the sale of sand
and gravel to a greater extent than the place where it was
maintained was not e~lained by the evidence. The maintenance of the batch plant on the Thorvaldson property
woo.ld not promote the sale of sand or gravel in their ·raw
state to customers who came to the premises for either of
these products. The maintenance of 1he batch plant could
not possibly affect the removal of the overburden or work
of the auditor in auditing the Jones books or to change their
method of k-eeping hooks. It would not deter or aid an
engineer in making a topographical survey to see how much
sand and gravel had boon removed.
As a general rule, the Courts hold that tenancies cannot be terminated unless there is a forfeiture clause con-

tained in the contract. See 51 CJS, 683, "Landlord and
Tenant", Section 104. We quote:
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"Necessity for Foreclosure Clause. In general a
tenancy oannot be terminated for breach of covenant
by the lessee unless there is an express provision in
the lease for forfeiture or right of re-entry in such
case.
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, tenancy Ca.P...'Ilot be terminated for a breach of ~covenant
by the lessee unless there is an express and distinct
provision in the lease for forfeiture or right of re-entry
on the occurrence of the breach or unless the breach
disaffirms or impugns the title of the lessor and tends
to defeat the reversion."
We quote from 32 Am. Juris., Sec. 848, page 721:

"A stipulation giving the lessor the right to re-enter
and declare a forfe~iture for the breach of specified covenants of the lease impliedly excludes the right to reenter for the breach orf other covenants." Citing
Burnes v. McCubbin, 3 Kan. 221, 87 Am. Dec. 468.
From 51 CJS, Sec. 102, p. 677, we quote:
"Forfeitures by acts of the parties to a lease, because of a breach of a covenant or condition or wrongful act of the tenant, are not favored by the courts."
See 12 Am. Juris., page 1016,

tracts'.'

Sec.

436, under "Con-

We quote:

"Forfeitures are not favored by the law; indeed,
they are regarded with disfavor. It is well settled that
forfeituTes by implication or by construction, not compelled by express requirements, are regarded with disfavor. Contracts involving a forfeiture ,cannot be extended beyond the literal meaning of the words used.
Since forfeitures are not favored either in equity or
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in law. provisions for forfeitures are to receive, where
the intent is doubtful, a strict construction against
those for whose benefi,t they are introduced. Courts
a r·e reluctant to declare and enforce a forfeiture if by
reasonable interpretation it can be avoided. Forfeitures are enforced only where there is clearest evidence
that that was what was meant by the stipulation of the
parties."
Quoting from 51 CJS, Sec. 104, p. 684:
"\Vhere grounds of forfeiture are expressly designated in the lease, a forfeiture will not be permitted
on other grotmds." Citing 112 SE, 512, Easley Coal
Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co.
See 32 Am. Juris, Sec. 848, p. 721, under "Landlord and
tenant". We quote:

''Forfeiture Clauses . . . Moreover, the settled principle of both law and equity that contractual provisions
for forfeitures are looked upon with disfavor applies
with full force to stipulations for forfeitures found in
leases; such stipulations are not looked upon with
favor by the court, but on the contrary axe strictly
construed against the party seeking to invoke them.
As has been said, the right to declare a forfeiture of
a lease must be distinctly reserved; the proof of the
happening of the event on which the right is to be exercised must be clear; the party entitled to do so must
exercise his right promptly; and the result of enforcing
the forfeiture must not be unconscionable."
We quote from 14 Am. Juris., 481, under title, "Covenants, Conditions and RestriCtions":

"It is the general rule that in every case the determination of the question whether a particular clause
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or provision creates a covenant or condition subsequent depends primarily upon the intention of the parties. If the language is clear and plain, the intention
of the parties is presumed to be what the language
clearly purports and the court decides the question
from that language. In those cases, however, where
the language is ambiguous and may create either a
covenant or a condition, the court, in determining
whether a covenant or conditioo was created, actively seeks to ascertain the intention orf the parties.
One important factor in the consideration of this question which is often conrtrolling, is that if there is any
doubt, the Court will favor the construction of a covenant rather than a condition, because conditions are
looked upon with disfavor by the cou.rts and all doubtful cases are decided in favor of a covenant construction."
See the case of Joyce v.

~rupp,

257 Pac, 124. We

quote from that case:
''The distinction between conditions and covenants
is a decided one and the principles applica~ble quite different. A condition is a qualification annexed to an
estate, upon the happening of wlhich the estate is enlarged or defeated, and it differs from a covenant, in
that it is created by ·mutual agreement of the parties,
and is binding upon both, whereas a covenant is an
agreement of the covenantor only. A breach of a condition on which an estate is granted works a forfeiture of the esrtrute, while 1Jhe breach of a sole agreement of the covenantor is merely ground for the recovery of damages.''

See Conolley v. Power, 232 Pac, 744, (Cal.) In this
case the contract ibetween the parties contained this language:
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"It is expressly understood, stipulated, and agreed
that all of the terms, promises, agreements, and provisions of this lease are express conditions, and not
mere covenants, and upon the breach or failure of the
lessees to carry out any of the same this lease shall
terminate and expire at the option of the lessor, and
all rights hereunder shall be forfeited, and the said lessees are to immediately deliver up peaceful possession
to the lessor.
"Time and punctuality are material to, and are of
the very essence of this agreement, and of every part
or portion thereof, to which the element of time and
punctuality are applicable.''
In interpreting this language, the Court stated that a
forfeiture can never take place by an implication, but must
be affected by express unambiguous language. As pointed
out before, the language in the present lease was certain
and unambiguous as to the reason why a forfeiture could

be declared and the Court made no finding with respect to
that issue, but declared a forfeiture for what the Court said
was an implied agreement.
See Easely Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 112 SE,
512. The facts are as follows: The Coal River Mining
Company leased certain coal land to Dalton and Bucks.
Lessees assigned their interest in the property to the Brush
Creek Coal Company. The assignment was made with the
consent of the lessor. Later the Brush Creek Coal Company attempted to assign its interest in the property to Easely Coal Company, the plaintiff in tllis case. The lease contained the clause which reads: "ThiS lease shall not be assigned or mortgaged by the lessees, or any part :thereof
sublet, except by consent of the lessor in writing."
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Plaintiff claimed that the original lessor, by reason of
his assent to the assignment to the lessee may now assign
his rights as freely a:s if no restriction upon assignments
had been inserted in it.
The Court said:
"\Vhefuer the Coal River :Mining Company has the
right of re--entry it claims depends upon the interpretation of the lease as to the status of the covenant or
condition in question with reference to the re-entry or
forfeiture clause"

We quote further from the Court's opinion :
"Forfeitures of estates are not favored in law. The
right to forfeit must be clearly stipulated for in terms,
else it does not exist. Every breach of a covenant or
condition does not confer tt upon the injured party.
It never does., unless it is so provided in the instrument
Such breaches are usually compensable in damages,
and if the forfeiture has not been stipulated for, it is
presumed that the injured party inrtended to be content with such right as is conferred by the ordinary
remedies. The broken covenant or condition relied
upon fo~ forfeiture must be foond not only in the instrument by dear and definite expression, but also
within th€1 forfeiture clause by such e,xpression. A
, covenant o~ condition merely implied, or an express one
nort dearly within the forfeiture clause, will not sustain
a claim of forfeiture by reason of its breach. Citing
cases."
We now addTess our rema,rks to the question of consideration. Albout the time the lease was made and entered into, Jones paid Thorvaldson $21,400.00 for equipment to operate the business of mining and extracting sand
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and .~ravt:'l from the leased premises.

TR. 237. Thorvaldson testified that he would not have leased the premises
unless Jones had purchased the equipment. TR. 243. Jones
testified that he would not have purchased the equipment
if he had not obtained a lease for the premises from Thorvaldson. because sand and gravel was necessary for the
business. TR. 262.

The lease recited that the Jones should pay 25c per
cubic yard for all sand, gravel and top soil mined and sold

by the Jones from the leased property and lc per yard for
all fill dirt sold from the leased property. The lease also
contains a proviso that Jones must supply all orders and
requests of customers and upon failure to do so, the same
will constitute grounds for forfeiture.

Thorvaldson had operated the sand and gravel business
at this same place for many years prior to the making of

the lease (TR. 241) and must have known something about
the volume of business the Jones might expect. This provision with respect to filling customers' needs was for his
protection and to insure him an income from the property.
This is not a contract where it was wholly optional
with the Jones whether they should perform or not. The
contract provides that if they should not perform and meet
the requirements of customers, then Jones' rights in the
property could be terminated. This contract is very analogous to what are termed "requirement contracts". See
cases dealing with this question in Williston on Sales, Vol.
2, Sec. 464 a, p. 739-742. We quote from that work:
"It is true, as a general rule, that if it is wholly
optional with one party to a bilateral agreement
whether he shall perform or not, there is no legal con-
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tract. The promise of that party in such a bargain is
illusory; that is, though in form a promise, it is so qualified that the promisor really engages himself for
nothing and his illusory promise is insufficient eonsideration to suppoct: a counterpromise. A promise to
buy such a quantity of goods as the buyer may thereafter order, or to take goods in such quantities 'as may
be desired', or as the buyer 'may want', is not sufficient -consideration since the buyer may refrain from
buying at his option and without incurring legal detriment himself or benefiting the other party.
"It was held in an early Minnesota case that an
agreement to sell all that the buyer might require or
want in his business was open to the same objection,
though the buyer promised to buy all he should
require; but the weight of authority is dearly and
rightly otherwise, whether the mutual promises are to
buy and sell all that the buyer requires or all that the
seUer pToduces. Though it may be true that a seller
by ceasing to manufacture may relieve himself from
any performance and srt:ill keep a promise to sell all
the goods that he manufactures, and similarly a buyer
by gomg out of business may avoid performance while
still observing the terms of an agreement to buy all
that he requires, these results can be obtained only
by conduct of the promisor which is in itself a legal
dertriment, namely, the cessation of business. Even a
promise to buy or sell only as much as the promisor
chooses is a sufficient consideration for a counterpromise when coupled with the agreement that whatever the buyer or seller chooses to buy or sell he will
buy from or sell to the promisee. To put the matter
in another way-the promise of a seller not to manufacture except for the, buyer, or the promise of a buyer
nort to buy except from a particular seller, is clearly a
promise to do something detrimental."
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See Graudis, et al. v. Helfrich, (Mo.) 265 SW 2d, 371.
Plaintiff promised to disclose the source of a large quantity of coal and
in rr-turn the defendants promised plaintiffs 50c per ton
for ~ach ton of coal dclendant purchased or severed from
such source. Plaintiff showed that defendant had severed
20,000 tons and the verdict was for plaintiff in the amount
of $10,000.00. We quote from a part of the Coullt's opinion:
~~Defendant initially contends that the purported
·(wal contract was void for want of mutuality; that
both parties were not bound by the alleged contract;
that defendant did not agree to buy any coal; that
there was no consideration for the alleged oral contract . . . . the alleged contract . . . . was unilateral
and unenforceable.'

That was an aetion for breach of contract.

"The agreement entered into between Braudis and
defendant constituted a bilateral contract, supported
by the respective considerations of mutual promises.
Braudis agreed to furnish information which apparently might be beneficial to defendant. Defendant
promised (an apparently possible benefit to Bra.udis)
to pay for such information on the condition that he
remove coal from the stated source otf sUJpply. These
mutual promises constituted sufficient consideration
for the bilateral contract."

To that effect see Williston on Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec.
104, p. 396.
See Stern v. Premier Shirt Corporation, 103 NE 363.
The <hn1: said:
"Agreements to buy or sell what will be needed or
required have been enforced by the Courts with unifonnity."
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In .A.llen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah, 608; 237
Pac. 2d, 823, the Court said:

"Mutual promises in each of which the promisor undertakes some act or fore!bearance that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to the promisor or bene..
ficial tn the promisee, and neither orf which is void, are
'sufficient consideration' for one another."
To the same effect see G2nola Town v. Santaquin City,
96 Utah, 88; 80 Pac 2d, 930. We quorte from the Court's
decision:
"It is said the contract lacks murtuality of obligation which prevents a court of equity from decreeing
specific performance. The argument is that such lack
of mutuality arises from the sixth paragraph of the
agreement which reads as follows: 'It is undeT'stood
and agreed between said parties that the Town of Geno!a is attempting to get a government project to establish its pipe Hne system and in the event said town
does not secure said project and obtain money therefor, then it shall not be liable under this contract.'

"The contention is that mutuality must be determined as of the date of making the contract which
was August 18, 1936; that on said date it was impossible to say whether Genola would be bound; that it
lay within the control of Genola to determine whether
it would be bound or whether it would bind Santaquin. Such is the case with many contracts whose
binding effect depends upon a condition precedent, the
carrying out o[ which condition precedent lies within
the power of only ooe of the parties to the contract.
The rule regarding mutuality of obligations as making
the eontract amenable to specific perfonnance is more
honored by exceptions than by obedience to the rule."
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The Olurt held that the contract did not lack mutuality.

Holding to the same effect is a case from California,
Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Company, 289 Pac 2d, 785.

See Fayette Coal Company v. Lal{e and Explore Coal
Cor-pm·ation, 23 ALR, 565. In this case there was a contract in which the defendant agreed to take the output of
two smrJl mines. There is no definite number of tons
specified, nor is there even an estimate as to the number
of tons expected to be shipped under the COilltract. The
defendants contend that by the contract, it did not impose
upon the plaintiff any duty to operate the mine; that the
only obligation imposed upon it was to sell such coal as it
produced at the mines to the defendant, and any time the
contract became burdensome to it, it coold escape the obligation of the same by simply closing down its mine and not
producing any coal. The Court says:
"It must be borne in mind that, when the parties
entered into this contract, they intended to accomplish some purpose by it, and this court will not give
to it a construction which will render it void, if it can
reasonably be interpreted so as to give it effect. There
is no uncertainty in the contract, except as to the subject matter thereof, nor does it appear to us that there
is very great uncertamty in this regard. The plaintiff had two small ·mines from which it was producing
coal, and the subject-matter of the contract was the
wtput of these mines. The reasonable capacity of the
mines at the time the contra.ot was entered into was
apparent to anyone reasonably familiar with the coal
business, and the defendant, when it purchased the
wtput of these mines, could, and no doubt did, inform
itself as to the amount of coal it could reasonably ex-
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pect to receive therefrom. .A.Jbsolute certainty is rarely
attainable. All that is required is reasonable certainty.
But the defendant insists that there is no obligation
upon the plaintiff, under the contract, to operate the
mines; that, even though it may be considered that
it would have to deliver to the defendant all of the
coal that it mined, still it could easily avoid its obligation by simply closing down its plant. But is this
true? The plaintiff sold and undertook to deliver to
the defendant at a certain price the output of its mines.
The parties contracted in relation to the conditions
that existed at that time. Could the plaintiff as a matter of law, at ·any time, cease operations and avoid liability? We do not think so. We think the plaintiff
was under rthe same obligation to operate these mines
in the ord:ina.cy way, in good faJth, that the defendant
was to take the coal produced under those circum-

stances.''
On the question of mutuality and consideration, see
McMichael v. Price, 58 Pac 2d, 549 (Okla.) The action was
instituted by Price doing business as Sooner Sand Company
to recover damages for breach of contract. Plaintiff recovered. The action was upon a contract which provides
that Price was seUing and shipping sand from Tulsa, Oklahoma to various points in the United States and that the
second party was the owner of a tract Olf land described
in the lease. The plaintiff, Price, agreed to buy from the
second party all rtJhe sand df various grades which he could
sell. Following the execUJtion of the contract, the defendant was alleged to have failed, neglected and refused to
furnish all of the sand which Price sold and defendant expressly repudiated and renounced the contract. We quote:

"Defendant contends that the contract between the
parties was a mere revocable offer and is not a valid
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and binding contract of purchase and sale for want
of mutuality. The general rule is that in construing
a contract where the consideration on the one side is
<Ul offer or an agreement to sell, and an the other side
an offer or agreement to buy, the obligation of the
parties to sell and buy must be mutual, to render the
contract binding on either party, or, as it is s01netimes
stated, if one of the parties, not having suffered any
previous detriment, can escape future liability under
the contract, that party may be said to have a "free
way out" and the contract lacks mutuality. (Citing
cases) Attention is directed to the specific language
used in the contract binding the defendant to 'furnish
cll of the sand of various grades and qualities which
ttle first party can sell' and whereby plaintiff is bound
•to purchase and accept from second party all of the
sand of various grades and qualities whiJCh the said
first pary (plaintiff) can sell.' lt is urged that plaintiff had no established business and was not bound rto
sell any sand whatever and might escape all liability
under the terms of the contract by a mere failure or
refusal to sell sand. In this connection it is to be noted
that the contract recites that plaintiff is 'engaged in
the business of selling and shipping sand from Tulsa,
Oklahoma, to various points.' The parties based their
contract on this agreed predicate."
The Court said:
"By the terms of the contract 1Jh.e prire to be paid
for sand was definitely fixed. Plaintiff was bound by
a solemn covenant of the contract to purchase all the
sand he was able to seU from defendant and for a
breach of such covenant could have been made to respond in damages. The argument of defendant that
the plaintiff could escape liability under the conrtract
by going out of the sand business is without force in
view of our determination, in line with the authorities
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hereinabove cited, that it was the intent of the parties
to enter into a contract which would be mutually binding.''
POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
JONES' FAILURE TO REMOVE OVERBURDEN, FAILURE TO MAKE SALES SLIPS AND JONES' REMOVAL
OF SAND OFF THE PREMISES WITHOUT ACCOUNTING FOR ANY OF IT, AND FAILURE TO ACCOUNT
FOR ALL SALES OF SAND AND GRAVEL CONSTITUTEID GROUNDS FOR FORFEITURE.

We submit that there is no competent evidence in the
record that the Jones failed to remove the overburden or
failed to make sales slips in the mrumer and at the time
as required by the contract, and that Jones failed to acCOIUilt for sand removed from the Thorvaldson property
onto the Jones property for purpose of processing the same;
but, if it be assumed that the Cow1:'s finding regarding
these matters is correct, we assert that they afford no basis
for declaring that the Jones have forfeited their rights in
the property. If the Jones' failure to remove overburden
had progressed to the point where they could not supply
the needs of customers, then that might afford a basis of
forfeiture, but such is not the case. All the other findings
relate to mattevs that are compensable in damages and
where such is the case, the Courts will not declare a forfeiture.

It is obvious, from the Court's remarks, that he did

not feel the above finding constituted grounds for forfeiture.

We quote:
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..The ones that I am concerned with mostly would
be rna terinls from other sources, the removal of overburden, and the removal of the business from the leased
land." TR. 307.
"The overburden, perhaps, could be rectified if
there is any default with respect to that. The other
matters probably cannot." TR. 307.
As to the Jones' failure to account for income, we
quote the Court's remarks after the evidence was all in:

"Failure to account for income. I think there has
been some failure, but probaibly an honest mistake has
been made. I think that is insufficient to justify forfeiture of the lease." TR. 306.
We quote from 12 Am. Juris., Sec. 440, p. 1020, under
title, ..Contracts":
"It is not every breach of a contract or failure
exactly to perform--certainly not every partial failure
to pelform-that entitles the other party to rescind.
A breach which goes to only a part of the consideration,
is incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of
the contract, and may be compensated in damages
does not warrant a recision of the contract; the injured party is still bound to perform his part of the
agreement, and his only remedy for the breach consists
of the damages he has suffered therefrom. (Citing
cases) Generally the failure of performance in order
to constitute a ground for recision must be total, such
as to defeat the object of the contract, or render irt
unattainable. The right to recision does not exist
where there has been a substantial, though not literally a complete, performance. (Citing J. W. Ellison
Son & Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 71 S. E. 391)
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On the question of recision or forfeiture of a contract,
see Canepa v. Durham, 153 Pac 2d, 899. We quote:
''A partial failure olf performance is no ground for
recision or£ contract unless it defeats the very oibject
of the contract, renders that object impossible of wttainment, or concerns matters of such prime importance that contract would not have been made if default in that particular had been e~pected."
On the questio.n of forfeiture, see Sonken-Galambra
Corp. v. Abels, 95 Pac 2d, 601. We quote from the syllabus:,
"Generally the failure of performance in order to
constitute a groun.d for recision must be total, such as
to defeat the object of the contract or rendering it
unattainable.
"Generally, forfeitures are regarded with disfavor
and an interpretation which does involve a forfeiture
is not favored."
Again quoting from 12 Am. Juris., page 1018:
"Resdsion is sometimes warranted by a breach of
contract. Whe,re covenants are mutual and dependent,
the failure of one party to perform authorizes the
other party to rescind the contract. The failure to
perform a promise, the performance of which is a condition, entitles the other party to the contract to a rescision thereof. But where the contract has been largely
carried into execution, and the engagements of the
parties were to be performed in the future, and their
performance was not made a condition, but rested
merely in covernanrt, a breaoh of them lays the foundation of an action, but no1Jhing more."
See Farnsworth v. Minnesot:Ja and P.R. Company, 92
U.S., 49. We quote from that case:
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"Where the penalty or forfeiture is inserted in a
contract merely to secure the performance or enjoyment of a collateral object, the latter is considered
as the principal intent of the instrument and the penalty i~ deemed as an accessory; but in every such case
the test to ascertain whether relief can or cannot be
had in equity is to consider whether compensation can
or cannot be made." (Citing 104 U. S. 88).
See the case of Priddy v. School District No. 78, 39
.AILR, 133·1. We quote from that case:

"The law is opposed to torfeiture of estates and
will not imply a forfeiture where none is expressed by
the terms of conveyance. (Citing a number of cases).
"If the forfeitw-e is not expressed by the terms of
the conveyance, an additional use of the property, if
it should constitute a wrong, cannot be made the basis
for an implied forfeiture , because the deed may happen
to provide for a forfeiture for some other act." (Citing cases)

See State, ex rel. City of Tacoma v. Sunset Telephone
and Telegraph Company, 150 Pac, 427.

We quote from

page 432 of the opinion:

"It is a principal of universal application that forfeitures are abhorred in the law and will not be declared, except in the clearest and most positive cases,
or where the contract broken so provides in express
terms. A forfeiture will be avoided, if possible. The
franchise ordinance was not plain and positive that
one of the conditions upon which it was granted was
that the holders of the franchise should establish, maintain, and operate an automatic system only, during
the tenn of the franchise, for it was authorized also
to conduct a general telephone business, and 'therefore
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dedicated its property to public use with all the duties
liabilities and requirements as well as privileges und~
our co!11Stitution and laws, such dedication implied."
See the case orf McNeese v. Wood reported in 267 Pac, ·
g-;7. In this case the lease contained two provisions for
forfeiture. One, that if the premises were used for any
improper, unlawful purpose that this shall work a forfeiture of the lease. There was another clause whioh said if
the lessess failed to pay rent for a period of 30 days, then
the lessee at his option might declare the lease forfeited.
The question was whether the 30 days period prevailed or
whetheT under the unlawful purpose use, they could immediately declare the lease forfeited. Utpon the first hearing before the Supreme Court, the Court held that the
lease could be declared forfeited, but upon rehearing this
was reversed and the Court said this:
"A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly
interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is
created.

"'Forfeitures, as such, are not favored by the courts,
and are never enforced if they are couched in ambiguous terms.
"A forleiture can be enforeed only when there is
such a breach shown as it was the clear and manifest
intention of the parties to provide for.
''The burden is upon the party claiming the forfeiture to show that such was the unmistakable intention orf the instrument. If the agreement can be
reasonably interpreted so as to avoid the forfeiture, it is
our duty to do so. (Quoting cases from California)
"References to cases orf like import might be multiplied." (Citing a number of cases)
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POINT ill
THERE WAS NO COMPEfENT EVIDENCE THAT
THE JONES EVER OBTAINED SAND OR GRAVEL
ffiOM OTHER THAN THE LEASED PREMISES UNLESS IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO SO TO FILL CUSTOMERS' REQUIREMENTS.
The Court made no finding that the Jones' acquisition
of sand or gravel from a source other than from the leased
premises violated the terms of the lease; but did remark
on this question while outlining his concern about the issues in the case. We, therefore, direct a few remarks to
that issue.
Jones testified that as long as he could get gravel from
the Oldroyd pit, originally subleased from ':Dhorvaldsons to
Jones, he did not go anywhere else for it unless it was a
certain specified material that somebody wanted. TR.
267. He also testified that he got very little sand from any
other source and that it was specified by the customers
as to the other source. TR. 267-268.
We submit that under the evidence, Thorvaldsons' primary purpose in making the lease was for the purpose of
selling their sand and that if Jones had failed to supply a
customer's needs merely because they could not get the
specified gravel from the leased property and thus not make
the sale, such action would have been in violation of the
terms of the lease.
CONCLUSION

The Court erred in finding that the Jones' operation
of the mix batch plant off the leased premises constituted
grounds for declaring that the Jones had forfeited their
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rights in the leased premises. The Court also erred in
finding that the Jones' alleged failure to remove the overburden and failure to make sales slips and removal of sand
off the premises without accounting for any of it and failure to accom1t for aJl sales of sand and gravel constitute
grounds for forfeiture. If there was a breach of these covenants then the remedy is compe!Ilsable in damages. The
Court erred in not finding that the only grounds for declaring a forfeiture was that which was plainly set forth
in the lease, to...wit, failure to operate the business so as to
adequately and timely fill all orders and supply all requests
of customers and that there was no evidence of the Jones'
failw-e in this regard.
Respectfully submitted,
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